

State of Ruins
The Dispossessed at the Vortex of Communal Whirlpool in Gujarat

A Report Prepared by
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For Prashant (Ahmedabad), Sahmat (New Delhi)

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Introduction

This report is based on a pilot survey study administered in two badly effected districts i.e. Panchmahals and Dahod, of Gujarat. During the survey 3264 individuals were interviewed in July 2002 with the help of about 100 enumerators. The study was warranted because various claims and counter claims were made by a whole host of agencies as to what has been the extent of damage caused during the carnage. Based on these estimates the state government distributed compensation to a few victims. The focus of the study was to record the gap between loss of moveable and immovable property and the compensation that the victims have received. It is generally believed that a very small number of those who were injured during the attacks have received any help from the state government. The study also aimed at probing as to what percentage of the victims who were injured have received any monetary help from the government agencies. It was decided that the study would also probe victims' perception of the role of police and the composition and size of the crowds that was mobilised for inflicting the damage.

For conducting interviews a interview schedule with about 130 questions was prepared. Besides the questions that were directly related to the objectives mentioned above, about 40 questions were formulated for recording the personal information about the respondents. There were three categories of the respondents that were identified before starting the survey operations a) for documenting the information about the families where all the family members were killed during the carnage the closest relative or the next door neighbour was interviewed b) in case head of the affected family was not present at the time of the survey the eldest available member was interviewed c) however, in most cases information was collected by interviewing the head of the family.

For conducting the survey three teams of enumerators were trained. The enumerators were drawn from three blocks i.e. Godhra (52), Hallol (18) and Kallol (30). One of the teams covered north-eastern blocks of Pnachmahals and Dahod Districts. The second team was given the responsibility of interviewing the victims in Kalol block and the third was sent to cover all the villages of Holol block. All the enumerators were students who had passed at least 12th standard and could read and write English language. Though the questionnaire was also translated in Gujarati language, in order to avoid problems at the data inputting stage they were instructed to record responses in English as far as possible. It should be mentioned here that the team of enumerators when sent to a badly effected village, besides conducting interviews of all the victims who lived there, covered the surrounding area as well. Invariably the local organisers in a village contacted victims from neighbouring villages before the arrival of the survey team and had asked them to be interviewed. This co-operation and foresight on the part of the local contact persons saved a lot of time and thus in four days the team could gather a sufficiently large representative sample. Some of these centres were located at Timba, Godhra, Lunawada, Ghogamma, Santrampur, Malvan, Fatehpura, Zhalod, Sanjeli, Sukhsar, Boru, Derol, Delol, Delol Station, Malav, Aral, Sanjeri, Arad, Vejalpur Baska and Kadachala.

Four days of working with a team of about 100 dedicated, honest, young boys who collected the data for the survey left us with lot of hope. All our previous visits to Gujarat had resulted in pessimism. The visits to Gujarat, in the initial months of the carnage, had given an impression, as if all the sane voices have been strangled, even the democratic space to express shock on the carnage had evaporated as the goons took charge of the entire state. Hooligans punished Mallika Sarabhai, Medha Patkar, scientists from PRL, Professors and students of IIM and NID for holding peace meetings.

Our hopes rejuvenated due to the attitude of these young enumerators. They had experienced the carnage from close quarters and had gone through the traumas associated with the worst of the times. They saw hoards of attackers surrounding their locality, they witnessed their houses being looted and felt the heat of the fire that burnt their houses, they were eyewitness to their dear ones being burnt alive, many of them witnessed gang-rapes for the first time in life. They, during the discussions, expressed extreme revulsion towards RSS, BJP, Bajrang Dal and VHP but had no bitter words, no communal remarks or feeling of hatred whatsoever, towards Hindus at large. They were all Muslims and religious too. The carnage taught them the most important lesson i.e. correct identification of the perpetrator of genocide. This had led them not to hate and reject a whole community, but condemns only the perpetrators of heinous crimes who used the smoke-screen of religion to hide their nefarious designs.

In the recent past many surveys were conducted on the victims of this carnage, at various levels. The camp organisers and local activists had started collecting the data of property loss and deaths and some initiatives were also undertaken to collate this data on block or taluka level. However, these efforts were quite disorganised and no realistic figures could be made available at district and state level. Thus, it was important to collect representative data at district level, which could show that how the state government had failed in its duty to make any realistic estimate of losses incurred and distribute relief money. It is important to reiterate here that besides creating a congenial communal environment and instilling confidence in the government structures specially impartiality of police, sufficient monetary help to individuals should be extended by the state government. These conditions though may not be sufficient but are necessary to resettle the population that has been uprooted from its houses and had no place to go back to. There were numerous instances where compensation was given to the victim but it could be categorised as 'abysmally low pittance'. There cannot be any rationale behind giving few hundred or thousand rupees where the house, be it kuchcha or pakka has been reduced to ashes. For example Yaqub Ismail Gachi of Moru village, Morwa Block, Panchmahals District, lost almost every thing that was there in his factory. The estimated value of immovable property before 28th Feb. 2002 was Rs. 8,00,000 property worth Rs. 7,00,000 was destroyed. He filled in the claim form for the same amount and was one of the lucky few who received the compensation, which was just Rs.35,500/-. Farooq Bhai Mohammed of Godhra was not so lucky. His house was completely burnt and as compensation he received a ridiculously low amount from the state government i.e.

Rs.500/-. Similarly, Basheer Sulaiman, Godhra, received a cheque of Rs. 4000/- as a compensation for his house, which was destroyed during the carnage. The only reason that could be attributed to this disposition is that the government wants to make political capital and is not sincere in helping people to rebuild their houses. The communal attitude of the Modi government is quite evident and the victims, by and large, are left in lurch or at the mercy of the NGOs. The political and moral pressure exerted from within and outside Gujarat has forced the government to distribute some amount of compensation to few individuals, but the act at the best could be termed as insincere tokenism. Some of the NGOs are doing wonderful rescue and rehabilitation work, yet on the whole their resources are like a drop in the ocean of fire lit by the RSS and VHP.

As the survey work proceeded, the extent, nature and geographical spread of the carnage unfolded itself. The areas, which are almost unapproachable, have not been spared (these roads were re-laid after the genocide). Sufficiently large trained gangs of VHP, RSS and Bajrang Dal armed with pistol, guns, bow and arrows, petrol filled bottles and cans and unidentified inflammable chemicals were mobilised to attack the localities. Cell phones were used to coordinate the attackers and to identify targeted localities. It was also reported that the leaders of spearheading mobs carried with them computer sheets for identifying houses of Muslim habitats. But the attackers did not want to take a chance: it was reported that in Timba village of Godhra Taluka all non-Muslim residents were asked to put saffron flags on top of their houses so that these could be identified from a distance. It seems, RSS workers through repeated detailed surveys collected the data over a period of past six months and this data was used for planning the carnage. However, it is beyond imagination that such a swift and efficient operation could be engineered without active local support. Members of Shakhwas operating in the villages and localities worked as the primary source of information even in those places where they did not directly participated in the attack. The attack was organised in such a manner that RSS and VHP members from one village were sent to lead attack in some other village which was about 10-15 kilometres away from their village. This to an extent helped in hiding the identity of the leaders and gave an impression that the local RSS and VHP members did not participate in attacking their neighbours. The organisers did not realise that since every single victim had to move to camps where they were forced to live together for months and relate their experiences to each other. Most victims with the help of each other were able to identify the perpetrators and did lodge complaints identifying the criminals. In most cases the police refused to lodge any FIR (First Information Report). In majority of cases they also refused to accept complaints where the victims had mentioned names of the criminals.

The attack on Muslim community came as a visitation, caught them completely unprepared and unaware, the intensity with which it struck them caused maximum damage. Yet at some places for example at Sanjeli, local Muslim population offered resistance on the first day of the attack i.e. on March 01, 2002. There are 450 houses, which belong to Muslims in Sanjeli village of Dahod district. All women, old men and children gathered in the local Masjid and a house located in front of the Masjid. Six policemen posted at the village Chauki and Hindu neighbours refused to

intervene. The young ones took to brick batting. Attackers managed to burn houses situated on the periphery of the habitat but as they proceeded towards the centre of the village the resistance intensified and the crowd of attackers retreated only to come back next day. They did not abandon the village and the siege continued. The police help did not come despite frantic telephone calls. No one ate food for 48 hours, not even young children. As the news spread to other areas that Sanjeli is under siege and the life of all the residents was threatened, political strings were pulled, and the District Police Commissioner was sent to the village. Later, a small picket of Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) was also sent but by then the abandoned houses had already been burnt. Next day as the night fell the Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) could evacuate the Muslims and took them to Dahod. Police suggested that every body should abandon all the belongings and the houses and leave for safety. They did not take any responsibility of saving the property of the inhabitants. As victims left for the camp every single house was looted, ransacked and burnt. Stories of most other villages we visited were equally horrifying. Victims including children were burnt alive, women were molested, forced to run nude, raped and then burnt. What was important to note in Sanjeli was that when the organised goons of RSS, Bajrang Dal and VHP did not achieve their target, reinforcements were sent and finally the next day they managed to destroy all the property and houses of the Muslims. To organise a crowd of attackers, which could maintain a high degree of hatred for about 48 hours requires extreme levels of indoctrination. Besides brainwashing a reassurance that no action would be taken against violators of law of the land by any government institution is also a necessary condition. Modi Government was more than willing to provide such a immunity blanket to those who executed the mayhem.

The other example that could be cited here is of Fatehpura village. In this village there are about 400 houses. It was reported that for the first two days the Police Sub-Inspector (PSI) in-charge of the area, kept the tense situation under control. He sought help from the Rajasthan police. Rajasthan police, it is reported, had orders from the Chief Minister to save as many people as possible, but they were debarred from entering into Gujarat and transport the villagers to a safe place in the adjoining state. The policemen from Rajasthan suggested that they would watch road and would give signal whenever they find it safe to travel. At about 10pm the information came to the Muslim villagers that they should start immediately and cross the border as soon as possible. As per plan the Rajasthan police was waiting for them at the border post. But the villagers had only one truck for transport and there were about 2000 terrified men women and children impatiently ready to board it. By this time the rescue efforts were quite disorganised. In first lot about two hundred people boarded the truck. There were many children among them. The truck was so packed with the passengers that there was no space even to breath. A mother carrying her one-year-old baby realised that she has been crushed to death due to the bumpy road. The truck could make three trips and save about 600 Muslims. By this time the road had again become unsafe and rescue operation had to be stopped. Next day PSI was transferred and the hell was let loose on 2nd Feb. 2002. Rape, murder, burning people alive and setting the houses on fire, every thing happened in the colony.

It is quite apparent that the aims of the attacks were three-fold:

- to humiliate the Muslim community,
- to cripple the whole target population economically and
- to destroy their movable and immovable property to the extent that they, for a long time, dare not come back to their villages.

Attackers succeeded in achieving all the three objectives to a very high degree. Except for densely populated localities where Muslims lived in sufficiently large numbers and lanes were narrow and not impregnable by trucks and tractors, almost all the houses of the minority community were destroyed in Panchmahals and Dahod districts. Those areas were also not attacked where houses of Hindus and Muslims were adjacent to each other and there was likelihood that burning one of the houses may destroy the entire locality. In such cases the Muslim houses were just looted and not burnt. For example Jalod in Dahod district has an area, which is very thickly populated. Muslims lived here in quite a large number. We found that this area was not effected at all. Adjacent to it is another high-density area where Muslims and Hindus lived adjacent to each other. It was impossible to target a Muslim house without damaging a neighbour's property. This part of the township was also left untouched. Similarly only one house in Sanjeli village was left unburnt. One could see 'Jai Shri Ram' written on the front wall of the neighbour's house, which was just one wall apart from it. However, inhabitants reported that all the belongings of the house in which a Muslim family lived was looted and ransacked. In Lunawada, all those houses and shops, which were located at the periphery of the town, were completely destroyed. Here the density of the population was relatively low and roads were broad enough to accommodate sufficiently large crowd of attackers.

The goons were essentially cowards and they could not commit these barbaric acts unless they pool their courage together. Even if the state government provided the blanket of immunity to them a critical mass was essential for committing the acts of violence. The most important factor that led to such large-scale destruction was that the fascist forces in Gujarat could gather at almost every place this critical mass of frenzied people. The size of the crowd that attacked Muslims varied to a great extent. The crowd size was a function of a combination of factors including the percentage of minority population, the concentration or the density of the habitation and the topography of the locality. This also leads to the conclusion that the attacks were meticulously pre-planned and premeditated. It appears that the plans for this fascist carnage were conceived at state, district, taluka and village level.

We on purpose have avoided collecting information and also making any judgements about the 'sparks', which led to the state-wide riots. The Godhra train incident is sub-judice and therefore, we resisted collecting information on this matter. However, as a matter of information, the report prepared by the Forensic Science Laboratory, Ahmedabad, is appended to this report for the benefit of readers.

Objectives of the survey

The broad objective of the study was to draw a fairly large representative sample from among the effected population of victims and probe their assessment of the damage that was caused by the VHP and RSS brigades and the actual help that they have received from the Government during the past four months. The study also aimed at collecting factual information relating to various features that distinguish the Gujarat carnage from any other riot or a series of riots experienced in the recent history of the country, particularly, after the partition. Other than the information about the actual incidents of arson, looting and killing observations concerning a few related issues also warranted investigation, for example, the role of neighbours, police and government hospitals. It was also important to elicit the identity of main organisers and perpetrators of the genocide. These perceptions in our opinion have been formed and transformed as a result of their traumatic experiences and would determine their attitude towards various social and political processes in the future. The broad objectives were divided into the following sub-objectives

- (1) Collect representative data at village level in at least two districts, which could show that how state had failed in its duty to make any realistic estimate of losses incurred, and distribute relief money.
- (2) Estimate losses per household of (a) immovable (b) movable (c) agricultural / live stock wealth
- (3) It was also decided that through the survey data would be generated about the participation of the neighbours in the carnage and the caste composition of the attackers. The data so collected was expected to give an idea of the mass base that was mobilised by the BJP, VHP and RSS combine for involvement in the carnage.
- (4) It has been said that the police participated in the genocide throughout the state. There were three levels of participation of the police. One it opened fire on the victims and broke the resistance that they could offer (as was the case in Naroda Patia, Ahmadabad). Two, the police instigated and supported the attackers and provided material help (as was the case reported from Dariyapur, Ahmedabad). The level three was that despite requests from the target population the police remained a silent spectator and did not protect them. To probe the attitude of the police was one of the objectives of the study.

- (5) The extent of participation of the members of RSS/ VHP / Bajrang Dal shakha members and also the participation of political figures.
- (6) Despite so much of communal poison spread through out the state there were a large number of people who maintained sanity and helped the victims. There are numerous incidents where the members of the majority community, jeopardising their own safety, saved the lives and property of the targeted population. One of the aims of the study was to put on record how many individual were involved in such efforts. We were fully conscious of the trying circumstances in which for every reported case of bravery and brotherhood there will be a large number of cases, which will go unreported because those who were saved would not put the lives of their saviours at risk.

Methodology

In order to achieve the objectives of the study it was decided that a questionnaire should be prepared. A mix of open ended and objective type questions were formulated to record the data through detailed interviews. However it was important to short-list the number of questions that were to be posed to a respondent. The experience has shown that the number of question in a schedule has a bearing on the validity of the data. The schedule was divided into sections and each question included was given a code. This facilitated not only the recording of data in an organised manner but also made the task of inputting the data for statistical analysis, easier.

As soon as the schedule was designed local volunteers were contacted to translate the schedule in Gujarati language, identify potential young enumerators and keep the teams ready for training. The target was to complete the entire exercise in about 10 days time.

Two districts of Gujarat state were selected for the survey operation. These were Panchmahals and Dahod districts. It should be mentioned here that besides being badly affected these districts have been kept away from the limelight. After the 28th February 2002 the focus of the debate, relief and rehabilitation activity were focussed on Ahmadabad. Though Godhra Township and block is situated in Panchmahals district, which is supposed to have ignited the fuse of communal bomb manufactured in the laboratory Hindutva, the genocide that took place in the villages has skipped the attention of media and people at large. More than 75,000 Muslim inhabitants of Panchmahals and Dahod districts had to leave their house and take shelter in the makeshift camps.

Godhra was made the head quarter of the survey operation. 52 young educated students were given training for conducting the interviews at Godhra. 22 enumerators were given training in Halol and 18 were pressed into action at Kalol townships. Many more enumerators were given training at village level where it was felt that the work couldn't be completed by the teams that were sent from the above-mentioned places. The educated young boys in the villages were more than willing to help us.

In all, **3261** individuals were interviewed and through them information about **16241** victims was collected.

As the first set of five hundred filled in questionnaires reached Godhra, it was sent to Delhi for inputting where a team of 20-trained keyboard operators started their work. The data so entered was analysed using computer statistical packages, however it was decided that only preliminary analyses would be presented in the report.

Throttled Voices - Data from the Survey

More than 3500 individual victims were interviewed during the month of July 2002 in the villages of Dahod and Panchmahals. After discarding the cases with insufficient information 3261 cases were analysed. All the individuals who were interviewed were heads of the family. These persons had first hand accounts of the carnage experienced by them. However, it should be mentioned at the outset that since the details of other family members were also collected the data represents plight of 3261 families and 16241 individuals. The average size of the victims' family was 4.98 members, which means on an average these families had three children. Compared to the national average family size reported by 1991 Census of India is 5.7 and for Gujarat it is 5.8, for the rural parts of Gujarat it is still high i.e. 5.9. This exposes invalidity of the campaign that RSS and other fundamentalist organisations have engaged in that Muslims produce more children, and in near future their population would increase to the extent that Hindus will turn into a minority community in India (In Gujarat the myth propagated was that population of Muslims is increasing at a very fast rate). During the survey we were also shown pamphlets in Gujarati language distributed for spreading this myth.

A survey conducted by the Co-ordination Committee of Refugee Camps of Godhra and Dahod reported that in Dahod district 180 villages were affected and this figure in Panchmahals District was 725. Victims from these villages were distributed over 10-relief camps set up in the two districts. It is further reported that 2239 families were targeted in Dahod district whereas 3206 families had to leave their houses in Panchmahals. The number of injured in Panchmahals alone was 477 persons and in Dahod district 241 persons were injured during the carnage. About 207 persons were killed during the attacks in Panchmahals and 47 persons died in Dahod. Put together out of these 254 dead only 108 were identified and the rest were declared as missing. And, until now only fifty families of those who were killed have received compensation. Just after the carnage in first few weeks the total estimated losses incurred due to the burning of shops, mosques, houses and transport vehicles were collated by the Co-ordination Committee of Refugee Camps of Godhra and Dahod for Panchmahals. The figure for Panchmahals alone was more than Rs. 809 million followed by losses incurred to the tune of Rs. 790 million in Dahod district.

These figures of economic losses were estimated immediately after the victims moved into the relief camps. Thus it is natural that the estimation was partial. The figures do not include the loss of movable property other than transport vehicles and also do not include the losses incurred after the victims left behind their immovable and movable properties.

Affected Families	Sampled Families	Sample as Percentage
5445	3261	60

It is evident from the above-collated data that these two districts were quite severely affected. It should also be pointed out here that through the present survey we have

been able to generate a representative sample of the affected families. We have covered about 60% of the families that were reported as victims by the Co-ordination Committee of Refugee Camps. Our survey does not cover damage assessment of public places such as Mosques, Digraphs, Madras as/Schools, and graveyard. Since these were common property of the Muslim community, it was difficult to make actual assessment of loss through an interview-based survey.

Comprehensive analysis of the responses based on the interview schedules is in progress using statistical packages and the preliminary analyses of the data are being presented in simple formats in the following lines.

Gender

	Percentage
Women	9.4
Men	90.6
Total	100.0

Of those who were interviewed about 9% were women. They were heads of the family. About 50% of these women had become heads of the family because their husbands were killed during the genocide. Most of them reported being housewives before 1st March 2002. In majority of these cases the bread-earning member of the family had died and the families had become dependent on the relatives or NGOs for survival.

Age

In Years	Percentage
Up 30	23.9
31-45	43.2
46-60	23.0
61-75	6.9
Above 75	1.0
Total	100

The analyses showed that the average age of those who were interviewed during the survey was 40.6 years. The age wise distribution revealed that about 43% of those heads of the family were within the age group of 31-45 years. About 24% of the respondents were relatively young i.e. in the age group 16-30 years. A few of these younger respondents were either the lone survivors of a family reporting about their lost families, or are neighbors reporting on behalf of totally wiped out families. This category also included those who were married at a young age and are leading nuclear families. A similar percentage constituted the age group 46-60 years. The percentage distribution also showed that about 8% were older than 60 years. All those who were

interviewed had to migrate to relief camps along with their families and had spent last three months there. Since there were three types of threat that the victims were facing, they, in order to decide the future course of action, were forced to strike a compromise. The first threat was the forced closure of the camp. The second was that if they went back to the village their lives would not be safe. The third was that if they do not go back and start rebuilding their houses, shops and factories then forced and illegal occupation of the property would take place. About one fourth of those who were interviewed still considered the living conditions in their native places quite hostile. Yet these heads of the families now carry the burden of rebuilding of the houses and resettling their families. The task for them is rendered increasingly difficult because of lack of help from any source and the apathy of the government agencies as would be documented later in this report.

Education

Level of Education	Percentage
Illiterate	21.9
1-5 Standard	22.1
6-9 Standard	31.4
10 Standard	16.0
11-12 Standard	6.2
Graduation	2.0
Professional courses	0.4

A large segment of the respondents (21.9%) was those who had never received any education. When compared with the national literacy rate or even the level of literacy in Gujarat, which is about 60%, the sample population fared far better. In all about 78% reported that they had received education up till first standard. Those who had received school education above sixth standard and had dropped at standard nine constituted the largest set. 16% were tenth pass, followed by those (2%) who reported that they had studied and cleared their graduation degree. A very small percentage (0.4%) reported that they had obtained a professional degree.

Occupation

	Percentage
Farmer	16.3
Service	5.1
Business	40.7
Teacher	0.3
Driver	7.4
Household	1.3
Student	0.1
Professional	0.1
Labour	13.8
Animal Rearing	0.2
Skilled	5.7
Religious	0,3
Any other	0.4
Total	100.0

It is evident from the data analysis that though the sampled population was engaged in a whole range of economic and professional activities, the focus of the attack was on shop owners, petty traders and businessmen. About 40% among the victims belonged to this category. The focus of the hate campaign that was perpetuated by VHP for the last few years was specifically directed towards the economic boycott of the Muslim community. It is evident from the analyses that the attacks were also especially focussed on completely destroying the economic base of the shop owners, traders and businessmen of the Muslim community. There were two segments of the society who were mobilised by the VHP and RSS combine. The first segment, among Hindus, was those who not only participated in the carnage but also supported it by contributing funds. They perceived this section of Muslims as their professional rivals and believed that the carnage would help in eliminating the competition. The second large segments of the attacker were goons who thought that they would gain and become rich by looting this relatively well off group of Muslims. Of those who were interviewed 16% were farmers followed by about 14% skilled and unskilled labourers. The villages were made special targets because it was easier for the attackers to hit the dispersed Muslim population and also remain hidden from the media gaze. This perception gains some validity from the fact that an urban area like Godhra town, despite its tinderbox like situation, did not experience any major riots or looting.

Monthly Income

	Percentage
No Response	13.8
Up to 500	1.3
501 - 1000	12.0
1000-1999	38.7
2000-4999	29.6
5000- 10000	4.5
Total	100.0

The reported income of the more than 80% of those who were interviewed was above Rs1000/- per month. About 34% heads of the family earned more than Rs. 2000/- per month. The analysis revealed that the economic status of the targeted victim population was fairly high. Family income of only 13% of all the respondents was less than Rs.1000/- per month. Of all the respondents interviewed 14 per cent did not reveal their monthly income. The pattern that emerges from the studies of most previous riots, shows that it is the lowest economic strata, which is socially most vulnerable too, be it Muslim or Hindu, are targeted during the attacks. In Gujarat the meticulous planning and administrative support ensured that all the sections among the Muslim population were hit, equally badly. The participation of middle class Hindus in the carnage at Lunawada resulted in complete destruction of the multi-storied house of a fairly wealthy Muslim who is a businessman and a local Congress leader. He reported that no poor person or Adivasi could have ever gathered courage to attack his house.

Size Of Crowd That Attacked

Number	Percentage
Not Answered	9.3
50	1.1
100	2.5
200	3.0
500	8.6
1000	5.0
2000	14.2
5000	25.7
10000	30.6
Total	100.0

It is evident from the data analysis that the crowds that were organised by the VHP and RSS varied a great deal in size. A correct estimation of the crowd was not possible, as the victims would have a tendency to overestimate the number of

attackers. But our analyses showed that extent of variation were quite large. It was apparent that the strength of the crowd that attacked was a function of the size of the locality and the concentration of Muslim residents in the area. The attacks were quite well organised. The number of RSS/VHP/Bajrang Dal workers who were brought in tractors, trucks, cars and vans were sufficiently large in number. To mobilise, organise and transport a mob of more than 1000 persons requires special organisational skills and a preparation for sufficiently long span of time. About seventy percent of the respondents reported that their locality was attacked by a mob, which was constituted by more than 1000 attackers.

Did Attackers Wear Saffron Band

Response	Percentage
No Response	10.5
No	5.6
Yes	83.9
Total	100.0

One of the question that was include in the schedule was ‘were the attackers wearing Saffron Bands on their forehead?’ To this question 84% respondents replied in the affirmative. Special care was taken by the organisers to provide saffron bands and cloth to the crowd that attacked Muslim localities. The reason, it seems, was two fold. First, since they wanted to hide the individual identity of attackers the cloth came handy and was used as a mask for hiding the face and second, these attackers were collected from different parts of the district and were not familiar with each other, thus it was necessary to provide them a collective identity so that they could recognise each other and not hurt their fellow attackers.

Who All Were The Attackers?

Response	Percentage
No Response	11.4
Sarpanch	1.7
VHP	5.0
RSS	.3
Local	.2
MLA	.2
Others	.5
Sarpanch and VHP	5.0
VHP and RSS	20.2
Sarpanch and VHP and RSS	55.4
Total	100.0

Who Were The Persons Involved In Attacks?

Persons	Percentage
Sarpanch	62.1
VHP, Bajrang Dal volunteers	85.6
RSS volunteer	75.9
Local leader	0.2

The recreated scenarios of attack, by the respondents, suggest that large mob led by VHP or Bajrang Dal and RSS have attacked the victims. The reported participation of these organisations is widespread. About 80% of the respondents have reported that members of VHP, RSS and Bajrang Dal actively participated in the attacks. When the respondents were asked to identify the attackers, most of them reported that the local leader, MLA or the sarpanch, did not lead the mob. Only 62 respondents reported that they had seen the local sarpanch present among the attackers. Local leader and MLAs were identified among the attackers by only 0.2 respondents

Cast Composition of Attackers

Response	Percentage
No Response	8.3
Patel	9.0
Rajputs	0.2
Tribals	23.8
SC	2.6
Patel and Rajputs	2.4
Patel and Tribals	27.3
Rajputs and Tribals	5.4
Patel, Rajputs, Tribals and SC	20.9
Patel, Rajputs, Tribals and others	0.3
Total	100.0

Castes

Caste	Percentage
Patels	59.0
Rajputs	39.0
Tribals	77.0
SC	2.9

When the question as to what was the caste composition of the attackers was posed to the respondent, about 21 per cent stated that members of Patel, Rajput, Adivasi and Schedule caste communities together had attacked them. This shows in large areas of the two districts a unity of upper and schedule castes, which is a rare phenomena, was achieved by the organisers of the carnage. However this fragile unity remained confined to only northern blocks of Panchmahals and Dahod. In southern parts of the two districts since the unity was not achieved they remained less effected. Further analyses showed that the Tribals were reported by the largest number of respondents (77 %), about 59.0 percent victims identified Patels as attackers and about 40% said that the mobs that came to attack them were constituted by members of Rajput community.

Did Neighbours Participate in Attacks?

Response	Percentage
No Response	10.7
No	34.2
Yes	55.1
Total	100.0

In most riots that have taken place in the past, it has been reported that mobs constituted by outsiders attacked a locality. The nature of Gujarat carnage differs in the sense that in a large number of cases the neighbours were mobilised to attack inhabitants of their own village. A vertical split on communal lines was engineered even at the village level. This leads to the conclusion that on the one hand the intensity of the hate campaign was quite wide spread and the degree of feeling of immunity from authorities that the attackers enjoyed was also quite high. One of the reasons for high percentage of killing could be attributed to this phenomenon. They were confident that even if the victims identified them no action would be taken against them. It should be noted here that the 34 percent of the respondents said that none of their neighbours had participated in attacks. A firm 'no' by such a large percentage of victims gives a lot of hope. The RSS has not been able to achieve 100% efficiency in tearing the social fabric on religious line. For secular forces in the state there still lies an opportunity to work for communal harmony and defeat the fascist forces.

Were Outsiders Led By Neighbours?

Response	Percentage
No Response	16.8
No	22.6
Yes	60.6
Total	100.0

The next question posed to the respondents was also related to the involvement of the neighbours in the genocide. About 60% of those who were interviewed reported that the outsiders attacked the locality but were led by their neighbours. Which leads to the conclusion that in about 5% cases the neighbours led the mob but they did not participate in the looting, arson, rape and murder.

Neighbours said they will save but attacked

Response	Percentage
No Response	24.5
No	56.9
Yes	18.7
Total	100.0

About 18% of all the respondents reported a breach of trust. The neighbours assured them that nothing will happen to the Muslim households but when the mob came they participated, along with outsiders in attacking the victims. Such an action could be construed as nothing less than premeditated cold-blooded murder. Without long indoctrination in fascist ideology, barbarism of this nature cannot be instilled among any group of human beings.

Weapons of attack

Response	Percentage
No Response	8.9
Petrol bombs only	0.5
Chemicals	0.2
Petrol and chemicals	0.5
Petrol, swords and chemicals	1.1
Petrol, gas, Acid, chemicals	2.0
Pet, sword, knife, Acid	7.4
Petrol, knife, Acid chemicals	17.6
Petrol, gas, Swords, Acid, Knife	9.5
Guns, Trishool, Chem, Petrol, Swords	52.4
Total	100.0

Weapons	Percentage
Petrol	91.0
Chemical	72.0
Swords	70.0
Trishool	52.4
Acid	26.5
Knife	17.0
Gas	11.5

The data revealed that for burning the house and human beings alike, petrol (or diesel, which was conflated as one by the respondents) was the most widely used chemical. More than 90% of the respondents reported that the attackers carried cans of petrol. Organising these cans and transporting such a huge amount of petrol to remote identified villages also requires preparation and organising skills. In all 17% also reported use of some special white coloured powdered chemical for burning the houses. Respondents alleged that this chemical was carried in small packets and just one packet was sufficient to burn the entire building. The victims also showed us patches of melted marble floors, which they claimed were caused by this chemical. Other than the patches on the floor where this chemical was used, the lower parts of the rooms were unaffected to the extent that even the paint on the walls was intact. It was noticed that in these rooms, above a height of about three to four feet everything was completely charred including the roof.

It was also quite apparent from the data that an overwhelming percentage of the respondent reported use of more than one weapon of attack. The range of these weapons was quite varied. Attackers carried with them trishuls, knives, swords, petrol cans acid bottles, pistols and guns. The use of bow and arrow, the most primitive, yet quite potent weapons, shows that a large number of tribals were present among the attackers.

Response Of The Police

Response	Percentage
No Response	8.1
No	29.6
Yes	62.3
Total	100.0

The role of state, particularly that of police officials, became an issue that was discussed leading to sharp differences of opinions among the people of this country. We therefore tried to elicit information about that the role of police during the attacks through a series of questions. About 62 percent of respondents reported the genocide was perpetrated in the presence of the policemen. About thirty percent of all reported that there were no police men posted in their villages. The villagers also reported that in most cases the policemen stayed as silent spectators. Repeated request to save the lives and property by the victims fell on deaf years. In case the policemen in an area tried to save the victims on 28th February or 1st March, they were issued transfer orders with immediate effect.

Number of policemen posted

Response	Percentage
No Policeman	52.5
10	35.5
20	8.1
30 and above	4.0
Total	100.0

When the respondents were asked as to how many policemen were present when the attackers came to rape the women and burn, loot, and ransack the houses, about 35% of them placed the figure some where between 1 and 10. More than 8% of those who were interviewed said that there were more than 20 policemen present at the time of the attack. This shows that the explanation given by the Gujarat administration that for such a wide spread, large scale carnage the state police was insufficient and was overwhelmed by the crowds of attackers, is only a lame excuse. It is evident that at most places the police personnel were present but did not intervene.

Police Participation In Attack

Response	Percentage
No Response	14.3
No	44.5
Yes	41.3
Total	100.0

Among those who reported presence of police at the time of attack, about 41% of the respondents reported that the police actively participated in the carnage and about 44% percent said that the police did not attack the victims or helped the attackers. It is quite clear that the police participation in the carnage was quite intense and was used to break the resistance offered by the victims. Without the connivance of the administration any large-scale carnage is unconceivable.

Police fired at victims

Response	Percentage
No Response	18.0
No	72.8
Yes	9.1
Total	100.0

About 9% of the victims reported that police opened fire at them instead of controlling the crowd of attackers.

Police Said They Can't Save You

Response	Percentage
No Response	20.3
No	54.5
Yes	25.2
Total	100.0

There were cases reported in the press that at many place the police expressed their inability to protect the victims. Many respondents reported having been forewarned that in case Muslims are attacked the police have verbal orders not to intervene at the best. Victims also reported that in few cases they had passed on the information that they had orders to 'shoot to kill' the local Muslim population and not at the RSS, VHP attackers thus Muslims should migrate to safer place.

Police Blamed They Are Responsible For It

Response	Percentage
No Response	19.5
No	50.1
Yes	30.4
Total	100.0

When the respondents were asked whether the policemen blamed them for Godhra train incident, one third of the respondent said yes. It is evident that policemen were also communalised and at many places they not only actively participated in the genocide but also believed that the Muslim community had to be taught a lesson for what they have done in Godhra.

Police Refused To Register FIR

Response	Percentage
No Response	11.7
No	39.4
Yes	48.9
Total	100.0

In order to elicit information about the action that police has taken after a period of about five months all the respondents were asked whether the First Information Report (FIR) was registered by the police or not. It was found that 48% who went to the police station to lodge the complaint but could not succeed in getting the FIR

lodged. The police refused to register cases where the complainants had mentioned names of the criminals. What has hurt the victims most is that the criminals who have participated in the carnage roam around freely in the villages and no action has been initiated against them.

Police arrested victims

Response	Percentage
No Response	11.0
No	85.2
Yes	3.8
Total	100.0

Among the victims who were interviewed only 4 percent said that instead of arresting the attackers and the criminals the police arrested the victims and framed charges against them. Of the total number of victims this figure appears to be small yet it should be noted that about 100 persons who either sought shelter or asked for justice were booked and arrested by the police.

Did Police supplied petrol to attackers ?

Response	Percentage
No Response	18.2
No	62.9
Yes	19.3
Total	100.0

At Gomtipur in Ahmedabad it was alleged that the police had supplied petrol to the attackers for burning the house. Thus, in order to collect information about the police attitude towards the attackers a question was posed to all the respondents if they had seen the police helping the mobs that had attacked them to the extent of supplying he petrol. About 19% of the victims reported that the police actually supplied petrol to the attackers. Though this percentage is not very high, the role of police, *post facto*, seems to be quite biased.

**Rays of Hope
Who Saved You ?**

Response	Percentage
Not Answered	45,2
Police	6.1
Neighbours	11.1
Tribals	0.0
NGO Activist	2.1
Friends	8.0
God	21.0
Police and Neighbours	1.3
Police, SDM, RAF	5.1
Total	100.0

We had included a question in the schedule ‘who saved your life? Analysis showed that about 45% of those who were interviewed had to save their life by themselves. The victims helped each other and somehow reached refugee camps on their own. This also means that their families, i.e. about 1470 families -did not receive any help till they arrived in these camps. The police, or the neighbours or the NGO activist saved the rest that constituted the 44% of all the respondents. One of the victims reported that one part of the family while running with bare feet at night was separated from the rest. This group had a woman who was pregnant and the labour pain started when they were hiding in the bushes. They approached the nearest hut, which belonged to an Adivasi family. They (Adivasi) not only provided all the required help but also fed the victims for two days. The news spread around and the Adivasi family had to abandon the victims. All the victims were killed including the two-day old child by the RSS and VHP brigade on their way to one of the Godhra relief camps. About 12% respondents reported that police saved their lives and about equal number was indebted to their neighbours for saving them from RSS and VHP brigades.

When did the Help Reach ?

Response	Percentage
Not Answered	43.4
12	15.5
24	8.4
36	8.4
48	15.2
60	.3
72	5.6
More than 72 hours	3.1
Total	100.0

The question as to how much time after the attack began, the help arrived was sought to gauge the response of state and civil society institutions. About 43% of the victims said that the help never arrived they had to find ways of reaching the camps on their own. For about 15% of the victims trauma continued for 12 hours and it took that much time for the rescue team of police or neighbours to organise a safe passage. 8% of all the victims reported that the help came after almost a day. About same number of victims had to wait for 36 hours before they could be rescued and about 24% reported that the dance of death continued for more than 48 hours.

Damage to Immovable Property

Property	1 Total Value	2 Value of Damaged part (2/1%)	3 Value claimed (3/2%)	4 Compensation (4/3%)	Comp/ Damage (4/2 %)
Pakka house	340000000	190000000 (56%)	33000000 (17%)	9047210 (27%)	4.7%
Flats	665000	665000 (100%)	600000 (90%)	1250 (0.2%)	0.18%
Half kachcha	40859230	30324745 (74%)	5384000 (18%)	1683045 (31%)	5.5%
Kachcha house	130000000	130000000 (100%)	21190400 (16%)	10894450 (51%)	8.3%
Jhuggi	13281750	6050000 (45%)	978800 (16%)		
Factory building	10020000	10020000 (100%)	1555000 (15%)	543510 (34%)	5.4%
Machinery	9443500	9443500 (100%)	2047500 (21%)	520000 (25%)	5.5%
Godown	12370120	9078000 (73%)	1677000 (18%)	32000 (1.9%)	0.3%
Shop	88210315	86992040 (98%)	11451500 (13%)	1270790 (11%)	1.4%
Office	6250000	6250000 (100%)			
Total	651099915	478823285 (74%)	58884200 (12%)	23992255 (40%)	5.0%
Extrapolation	1085166525	798038808			

It has been pointed out earlier that a matrix was included in the schedule for recording estimated losses of property. The above table gives an over view of the aggregate losses and the compensation received by the victims. There were ten categories of the immovable property, which were destroyed during the carnage. The data has revealed that total loss of immovable property was of the order of Rs. 478 million, however compensation given to the victims adds up to just 5% of the total loss. The average estimated loss per family due to destruction of immovable property was Rs.1,46,833/- and the reported compensation-paid was about Rs 7,357 per affected family. With the money, which has been given as compensation, the victims complained that they could not even think or imagine of re-building their houses. In a few cases the amount was ridiculously low (see annexure), but the victims accepted it just because this would help them in their future legal battles. At least they could prove in the court of law that they were recognised by the government as victims. Giving a cheque of Rs. 500/ for rebuilding a completely burnt house amounts to nothing but adding insult to injury.

The brick houses with cemented roof were categorised as pakka houses. Analysis shows that the estimated value of the property in this category was worth about Rs.340 million. Those who had come to destroy this property succeeded in damaging it to the extent of 56% percent i.e. the total loss of property in this category was worth Rs.190 million. Reportedly, the victims could claim compensation for only 17% of the total damaged property. This indicates that a very large number of applications for compensation have not been registered. In a cultured society it should be responsibility of a civilised government to make an assessment of the loss that the victims have suffered and rehabilitate them.

It has also been pointed out that shops owned by Muslims were specifically targeted during the attacks. At an aggregate level the shopkeepers had suffered a loss about Rs.86 million. This was the damage done to just the immovable property i.e. the structures in which shops were housed. The Government till now has paid a paltry compensation, which amounts to just 4% of the total value of damaged shops.

Kachcha houses appear to be the second on the hit list. Kachcha houses worth Rs.130 million were destroyed during the attacks. It was revealed by the data that 8 % of the total reported losses were given as compensation to the victims who belonged to this category.

It was reported that at most places the damage-survey has been completed by the government agencies yet the amount that has been given as compensation does not indicate that Gujarat Government is sincere in rehabilitating the victims

Damage to Moveable Property

Item	1 Cost (Damage%)	2 Compensation (2/1%)
Television	6364620	544810 (8.5%)
Radio	1281220	
Music system	136920	
Refrigerator	5341700	234200 (4%)
Stove	1924775	
Fans	4545630	
Wooden furniture	20100390	8000 (0.03%)
Steel furniture	10879800	13900 (0.01%)
Kitchen ware	15779890	211750 (1.3%)
Jewellery	27697260	28110 (0.1%)
Cycles	2862130	25000 (0.8%)
Scooter	7788980	
Auto-rickshaw	2700670	
Trucks	2344680	
Items in shop	57684730	421500 (0.7%)
Factory items	6145640	860000 (14%)
All others put together	96420965	560229 (0.5 %)
Total	270000000	2907500 (1.0%)
Extrapolation	450000000	

The data revealed that the loss of moveable property that the sampled victim population suffered were of the order of Rs. 270 million. The average loss per family was about Rs. 90,244/-. The analyses also revealed that the range of losses incurred was Rs. 1500 to Rs1.8 million. The compensation from the government works out to be negligible too compared to the damage. The average compensation per family paid to the victims works out to be abysmally low i.e. Rs. 1422, with a range from Rs. 1000/- to Rs. 1,90,000 has been given to the victims. The total amount that has been paid to the victims, as compensation, is just 1.0 per cent of the total damage incurred during the carnage.

The table given above reveals aggregate-reported-losses incurred in each category of 16 items. Though that data was separately collected for 36 items, in order to make the table more readable and less unwieldy 20 were put together in the last row. As has been mentioned earlier the Muslim businessmen and petty traders were specifically targeted. The shops all over the two districts were looted, ransacked and burnt. All put together sellable items worth Rs. 57.6 million looted from the shops run by the Muslims. In certain cases where the standing inventory could not be looted the shop along with all its movable property was simply burnt. Losses incurred due to burning of shop-buildings were separately reported in the previous section. Jewellery had a special attraction for the RSS/VHP brigade. It was reported by the victims that ornaments worth Rs. 27.7 million were looted from the houses and jewellery shops

before setting them to fire. Losses incurred due to burning of wooden and steel furniture and kitchenware are also worth mentioning. These losses add up to Rs. 35 million. The category 'other items' included things such as stored food items, gas cylinders, stoves, clothes etc. The reported damages or looted moveable property, clubbed in this category was worth Rs. 270 million. It is futile to discuss the compensation offered to the victims because compensation calculated as a percentage of estimated losses were just trifle. Only in case of destroyed movable property of factories, the percentage of compensation touched a double figure (14%). It should be noted here that this percentage amounts relatively high because, insurance money received by the victims was recorded in the column. The figure does not reflect compensation granted by the Government. The compensation given to the television set owners scores the second highest on the Government compensation scale. However, the data analysis revealed that the television sets worth Rs. 6.4 million were either looted or destroyed and only 8% of the total loss has been paid as compensation. The table given above shows that in all other categories of items lost the compensation paid varies from 0% to 4%.

It is quite evident that government agencies are not sincere in rehabilitating the victims, as reported by the wide gaps between the claims and compensation paid to the victims. The fear of future attacks still looms large. Threats by the VHP and RSS to the victims' families still continue. Police still refuses to register complaints. Rapists and killers still roam around freely in the same villages where victims are being force to resettle. It is in these '(ab)normal circumstances' that the state Government has declared conditions fit for holding elections.

Summary of the findings:

- The findings presented in this report are based on the survey administered in two districts of Gujarat, namely Panchmahals and Dahod
- The survey was conducted in the aftermath of Gujarat genocide
- Data was collected in four days, i.e. from 8th to 11th July 2002-07-20
- The aim of the study was to collect first hand information about the degree of property damage, extent of compensation given to the victims, attitude of police, attitude of neighbours, caste composition and political affiliations of the attackers, range and nature of weapons used.
- More than 3500 family heads were interviewed during four days and after cleaning the data 3261 cases were analysed. This number constituted about 60% of those families who were registered as victims in the relief camps
- The data analysis has revealed that total loss of immovable property was of the order of Rs. 478 million, however compensation given to the victims adds up to just 5% of the total loss
- The loss of moveable property that the victim population suffered was of the order of Rs. 27,00,00,000/-. The estimated average loss per family was about Rs. 90244/-.
- The total losses (extrapolated) for the entire victim population of Dahod and Panchmahals when computed were Rs. 1.248 billion.
- The compensation figures reveal the insincere efforts being made by the state government agencies in rehabilitating the victims.
- The objective of the carnage quite clearly, was to fold, firstly, to loot, burn and completely destroy all the shops owned by the Muslims and secondly to force them out of their habitat. Both the targets were efficiently achieved.
- The data revealed that tribal population was mobilised under the leadership of upper caste (Patels and Rajputs) for attacking the members of the minority community.
- The attacks were premeditated and well organised. They cannot be construed as a spontaneous reaction to any incident. Organising bands of 1000 to 10,000 attackers requires long duration planning.
- Large amount of petrol and other inflammable chemicals were made available to the attackers. This cannot happen without connivance of state machinery.
- The data revealed presence of police in sufficient numbers at the time of the attack.
- Police, during the carnage, by and large helped attackers instead of saving the life and property of victims.
- Attitude of the police has not changed during the past five months, it still refuses to accept any complaint that mentions names of the criminals. Close to 50% of all the victims said that the police did not accept their complaint.
- The victims reported wherever the police officers had tried to control the mobs, they were transferred and then free hand was given to the attackers.
- 19% of the victims interviewed reported that police had supplied petrol to the attackers.

- About 80% of the respondents reported that members of VHP, RSS and Bajrang Dal actively participated in the genocide.
- 84% respondents said that the attacker were wearing Saffron bands on their fore head.
- 44% of the victims said that still cannot go back to their villages, rest of them expressed that during the day they have started building their houses but cannot take the risk of staying at night.

Forensic Science Laboratory, State of Gujarat
New Mental Corner, Ahmedabad –16

Date : 17-5-2002

Spot investigation report No. 2 regarding CR No. 9/2002, Godhra Railway Police Station

A team forensic experts had visited the place of offence on 3/5/2002 in which along with the under signed Shree A.N. Joshi, scientific officer, Ahmedabad was included. In order to recreate the real picture of how the offence was committed on the day of incidence, one coach of the train was kept on the same spot. With the help of different types of containers experimental demonstrations were also carried out by using liquids inside the said coach. On the basis of which the following conclusions were made.

1. It was found that the height of the window of the coach was around 7 ft. from the ground at that place. Under this circumstance, it was not possible to throw any inflammable fluid inside from out side the coach from any bucket or carboy, because by doing this, most of the fluid was getting thrown out side. At the place of the incidence there was one heap of grit of three feet height at a distance of around 14-ft. in the southern side of the coach. Water was thrown on the windows of the coach with the help of buckets by standing on top of the said heap, in that case only about 10 to 15% of the water went inside and the rest of the quantity was spilled out side itself. Thus if the inflammable fluid is thrown from out side then major part of it would fall around the track out side and catch fire and cause damage to the outer part of bottom side of the coach. But after examination of the coach and the track, no effect was found of the fire on bottom side below the windows of the coach. By taking in to consideration this fact and also the burning pattern of the outer side of the coach, a conclusion can be drawn that no inflammable fluid had been thrown inside from out side of the coach.
2. There also appears to be no possibility that any inflammable liquid was thrown through the door of the bogie.
3. By Standing in the passage between the compartment of the bogey and the northern side door of the eastern side of the bogie, water was poured towards the western side from a container with a wide mouth like a bucket; in that case most part of the bogie was covered with 60 liters of water. By pouring the water in this manner, the water went only towards the West and no part of it came out of the door nor did it go towards the latrine side.
4. On the basis of the above experimental demonstration such a conclusion can be drawn that 60 liters of inflammable liquid was poured towards the western side by using a wide mouthed container by standing on the passage between the northern side door of the eastern side of the S-6 coach and the compartment of seat No. 72 and coach was set on fire immediately thereafter. If the period after the train had started from Godhra Railway station, intensity of fire, the degree of burn of the objects that were burnt inside the bogie etc

are taken into account, it can also be concluded that a large quantity (around 60 liters) of highly inflammable fluid was used to set the aforesaid fire and that the fire had spread very rapidly.

Sd/-

Dr. M S Dahiya
Assistant Director
(seal)

Note: The sketch of the coach and the sketch of the spot are included.

Forensic Science Laboratory, State of Gujarat
New Mentle Corner, Ahmedabad –16

Date : 17-5-2002

Spot investigation report No. 1 regarding CR No. 9/2002, Godhra Railway Police Station

The Forensic experts had visited the place of offence on 1/5/2002. In the team of the experts along with the under signed the other experts were Shree A.R. Vaghela, scientific officer, Vadodara, Shree Yogesh Patel, scientific officer (mobile), Panchamaharaj and Shree S.I. Desai, photographer, Surat. The experts had made detailed investigation of the burnt down S6 coach of the Sabarmati Express train. The said coach was kept in the yard of Godhra railway station. The observations made on the basis of the informations learnt by the detailed examination of the coach are as under.

1. A large number of hit marks were observed on the outer part of the southern side of the burnt out S6 coach which were due to stones. Apart from this a large number of stones were found scattered inside the coach and similarly glass pieces were also seen. It was found that the said glass pieces were of the windows. From these observations it is possible to say that there was large scale stone pelting on the coach from outside and the glasses of the southern side was primarily broken due to stone throwing and the glasses of the northern side were broken due to the heat of the fire.
2. From the condition of the color on the door of the coach, the burning pattern, condition of the hand lock, the marks of the melting Aluminum strips of the frame of the window etc, it can be established that both the east-west doors of the northern side of the coach and similarly the eastern door of the southern side, thus a total of three doors were opened at the time of the incident of fire and the door in the west direction of the southern side was closed.
3. Out of the windows in the southern side, one rod of one of the windows was found to be broken due to heat. As the height of the lower part of the window was at the height of more than 7 ft. from the ground, it negates the possibility of force on the rod from the window side. Further, it was not found that any instrument was used to bend the rod. Thus, it becomes clear that the rod was attempted to be broken by the use of force from inside. It appears that the other rods had become loose due to the melting of joints due to heat.
4. By observing the burning pattern inside the coach, its degree, the depth and the elongating pattern on the floor, it appears that the fire had spread inside the coach very rapidly. Further by observing the intensity of the elongating pattern on the floor, it appears that the fire had started from the eastern side of the coach and there after spread towards western side rapidly. Further, it appears that the intensity and proportion of the burning of the objects inside the coach was very high up to around 80% part of the east to west side

whereas in the rest of the 20% part, the intensity of burning was less in comparison with 80% part.

5. No sign was observed of the use of any corrosive fluid like the acid in the said fire.
6. By observing the condition of the frames of the windows of the coach, it appears that all the window of the coach were closed during the time of the fire.

Dr. M.S. Dahiya
Assistant Director.
(Seal)

Conceptual and data map of the survey schedule

Personal Details of the Respondent

- Status of Respondent vis a vis victim/s
- Block wise distribution of victims
- Period of residency in the village or locality, which was attacked
- Gender
- Age of the respondent
- Occupation of the respondent
- Caste composition of the respondents
- Mother Tongue
- **Family details**
- Economic status of the effected family though indirect indicators
- Size of the family
- Gender ratio of the victims
- Educational status of the victims
- Occupation of the victims
- Reported Monthly earning
- Age of the injured

- Claims in case of injury
- Compensation received by the injured
- Nature of injury (Burns, Cuts, Fracture, Impaired, “left hand, right hand, legs, skull”)

The damage to the extent of death

- Gender ratio of the killed
- Compensation given to the family of the killed persons, by the government
- Help extended to the family of the Killed persons, by the NGOs
- Claim and compensation
- Nature of hospital where MLC was registered.
- Identification of dead bodies
- Panchnamal recorded
- Death certificates issued

Details of rape victims

- Age of victims of Rape
- Number of cases that were medically examined
- Compensation received
- Help received from the NGOs

- FIRS registered or refused by the police
- Perpetrators were arrested or not

Damage to immovable property

- In order to assess the damage to immovable property 50 variables identified and were organised in a 10 X 5 matrix
- Claim received from insurance agencies
- Survey of damaged property by the Government agency.

Damage to movable property

- Damage to movable property. A matrix of 31 X 5 was constructed for collecting and analysing the data
- Loss of livestock was separately analysed with the help of a 8 X 5 matrix

Composition of Attackers

- Size of the mob that attacked
- Identification of the attackers
- Status of identified persons
- Caste composition of the attackers
- Extent of participation of neighbours
- Attitude of neighbours
- Extent of participation of outsiders
- Weapons of Attack

Attitude of police

- Attitude of police was measured on a 9-point scale
- Delay in rescue operation

Ray of hope

- The nature and composition of help